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After a period of consultation, it has been decided that the Revenue should be empowered to issue
legally-binding rulings in favour of taxpayers only where the relevant transaction has already
taken place. This paper considers the reasons for having binding rulings, and argues that those
reasons justify implementing pre- as well as post-transaction rulings. Additionally, it is contended
that many of the more detailed aspects of the proposal warrant reconsideration in light of those
underlying rationales.
JEL classification: H20, K34.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the recent consultation on pre-transaction rulings, Ministers
have decided not to proceed at present with the introduction of a formal,
comprehensive scheme for giving pre-transaction rulings. Instead they
have decided to introduce a comprehensive scheme for giving post-
transaction rulings early next year in time for self-assessment.
1
With this statement, the Revenue’s initiative for a full system of advance rulings
2
in the UK is now suspended, if not defunct. But was the Ministers’ decision the
right one? Or is the demise of pre-transaction rulings instead to be lamented?
This paper has two aims. The first is to show why advance rulings, including
pre-transaction rulings, would be a beneficial feature of the future structure of tax
administration in this country, particularly in light of the advent of self-
assessment. The self-assessment system is a revolutionary innovation in the way
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tax is administered in this country, and the interests of affected taxpayers should
be of paramount concern as the Revenue transfers the responsibility of collecting
the right amount of tax over to those taxpayers. It will be argued here that, as the
Consultative Documents (and the responses thereto) recognised, an advance
rulings regime will help to promote greater taxpayer certainty. However, the
Revenue’s understanding of how it might promote such certainty is incomplete.
Primarily, the Revenue has seen the role of advance rulings as being to help
taxpayers who seek to know the quantum of their obligations under the tax law —
something of increased importance in the new context of self-assessment. Hence
its ambition has been whittled down merely to complementing existing
mechanisms with a procedure for post-transaction rulings. As will be suggested
below, this position neglects the fact that taxpayers can also benefit by having
certainty about the way in which the Revenue will apply the tax laws — especially
in respect of transactions that have not yet occurred. Thus the Revenue’s
conclusion is defective: a more comprehensive system of advance rulings should
be adopted. Its understandable reluctance to undermine the existing system of
informal advice has led the Revenue partially to miss an opportunity to make a
radical and more substantial contribution to tax planning and tax risk management
by taxpayers — and thus to play its part in creating an environment of economic
certainty for business growth.
So a system comprising both pre- and post-transaction rulings is desirable. But
what form should it take? This is a question that the Revenue still must answer in
respect of post-transaction rulings; and one that remains of interest to advocates of
pre-transaction rulings. The second part of the paper discusses some of the
characteristics that should be present in any advance rulings regime proposed for
the UK, in order to ensure that the interests of the taxpayer are adequately
protected. In particular, the system envisaged for the UK will be considered in an
effort to discern whether the policy rationales underlying the Revenue’s own
proposals are properly reflected in its content. International comparisons will be
made, particularly with reference to New Zealand, a Commonwealth jurisdiction
that shares many of the features of the UK tax administration system, and which
has itself very recently implemented its own mechanism for providing binding
rulings.
3 It will be suggested that many aspects of the Revenue’s initiative warrant
reconsideration, if the content of the regime is to be consistent with its policy
rationales, while at the same time heeding the constraint of seamless operation
within the existing UK tax administration.
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II. THE NATURE OF RULINGS
For ease of reference, it is useful to begin with some definitions. In general, an
issuing body might be empowered to make any of three categories of advance
rulings.
1. Public Rulings
These are public statements volunteered by the Revenue without regard to specific
facts (and in the knowledge that they are self-binding), which are aimed at
providing taxpayers with the Revenue’s interpretation of tax law. For the most
part, we shall not be concerned with this variety of ruling here.
2. Private Rulings
These are specific rulings requested by individual taxpayers in order to confirm
the Revenue’s interpretation of the tax consequences pertaining to particular
transactions or arrangements. Depending on the jurisdiction,
4 private rulings may
be available either (i) only prior to the implementation of a proposed transaction,
or (ii) only where the transaction is already in place, or (iii) both — that is, when
both pre-transaction and post-transaction rulings may be sought.
3. Product Rulings
‘Product rulings’ do not state how the Revenue views the application of law with
respect to the affairs of a particular taxpayer. Rather, a product ruling gives the
Revenue’s tax characterisation of a transaction or arrangement (the ‘product’) and
specifies how it will be treated for tax purposes. The product ruling is an
innovation from New Zealand which is designed to satisfy a need that can
sometimes arise because private rulings are neither published nor of general
binding application. The problem occurs where it is impossible or impractical for
each person affected by a particular product separately to apply for a private
ruling, and where a ‘class application’ is not possible because the product holders
are not yet ascertained (for example, where a company promoting a debenture
issue that has not been publicly launched seeks a product ruling on whether
income arising therefrom is interest and not dividend). A product ruling can only
be issued where it is clear that the characteristics of any potential taxpayers will
not affect the content of the ruling.
The Consultative Documents contained no firm commitment to the
incorporation of product rulings.
5 None the less, it appears that the Revenue now
intends to ‘explore the possibility’ of introducing such a mechanism. While a full
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consideration of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, the view taken here is
that product rulings are worthy of inclusion in the UK regime, because their
information content will, as with other forms of advance ruling, assist in
facilitating decision-making for corporate and investment activity. It is worth
noting, however, that the Revenue’s objective in introducing such a scheme would
apparently be ‘to give greater certainty to potential investors in new products,
while at the same time ensuring that any such system of rulings was not exploited
by those wanting to develop products involving tax avoidance’.
6 This rationale is
hard to distinguish from that supporting pre-transaction rulings, and indeed
product rulings may reasonably be seen as a special type of pre-transaction ruling
— something reflected in the Revenue’s expressed concern over anti-avoidance,
which seems also to have underwritten its reluctance to embrace a pre-transactions
regime. The issue of refusing to rule where there is an avoidance motive will be
discussed further below.
III. THE NEED FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
1. Certainty
The fundamental characteristic of a regime of advance rulings is that it commits
the Revenue to any representation made by the issuing body under the regime
(subject to the usual caveats of imperfect factual information or change in tax
law). This feature is indispensable; by contrast, whether such rulings also bind the
taxpayer is a matter upon which different tax jurisdictions have come to different
conclusions.
Government Ministers are often advised by those reporting on fiscal policy that
advance rulings are a necessary ancillary of a system of self-assessment.
7 The
Minister may also be advised, for it is certainly true, that advance rulings have the
primary virtue of providing taxpayers with certainty. This virtue is intrinsic to
their capacity to bind the Revenue. There are two situations where certainty might
be of benefit to a taxpayer. The first occurs where the taxpayer is able, in
advance, to ascertain the tax treatment of an arrangement that is contemplated but
not yet implemented. Certainty in this case is supplied by what are known as ‘pre-
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transaction’ rulings, which, by facilitating the decision-making process,
8 help to
create a climate for growth in businesses and investments. The second situation
arises where the taxpayer wants to know if his return under a system of self-
assessment will meet with the Revenue’s agreement. Here, ‘post-transaction’
rulings are thought to prevent the self-assessing taxpayer from having to wait
longer than previously he would have in order to be assured that the Revenue is
satisfied with his return.
9 Thus they assist the taxpayer’s forward planning in the
light of known future cash flows. In addition, both types of ruling help to ensure
the taxpayer knows his legal position so that he can avoid any penalties associated
with an incorrect self-assessment.
One of the Revenue’s misgivings over pre-transaction rulings centres around
the fact that it already has a mechanism in place for giving informal advice to
taxpayers. Thus, in order to assess the need for a formal regime, we must first
consider the current practice of the Revenue and the status of the advice it already
gives.
The role of the Revenue is to administer and assess those taxes that Parliament
has sought to impose.
10 The delegated authority given to the Revenue, to quantify
the amount of tax payable, has resulted in the development of a body of expert
knowledge (which is not, of course, dispositive of the law) regarding the
interpretation and application of taxing statutes. At present, the Revenue is under
no obligation to publish the views its expertise leads it to hold. However, it
appears that, if they are published,
11 any taxpayer who is able to bring himself
within the purview of the Revenue’s advice may be able to claim the benefits of
any statements or concessions contained therein.
12
In addition, the Revenue has a long-established facility for giving informal
advice on specifically-contemplated arrangements. The facility is made available
to taxpayers through local tax offices, and operates in effect as a mechanism for
providing private pre-transaction rulings.
13 Formal authority, however, for the
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Revenue to provide binding clearances is at present limited to specific legislation.
14
Thus the Revenue is normally not bound by any informal advice it gives,
something that it has itself emphasised:
In certain circumstances Inland Revenue officers are, on the authority of the
Board, prepared to comment on draft documents or on the taxation
implications of some proposed financial or family arrangement.... In this
connection, the Board consider it important to make clear the primary duty
of the Inland Revenue towards the taxpayer. It is to assess his liability after
the end of the year in accordance with the statutory rules, so that the correct
tax can be collected or repaid where appropriate. While tax offices try
within reason to give informal general guidance about the tax system, or a
particular part of it, it must be emphasised that they are not responsible for
advising anyone on how to minimise his tax liability.
15
The disclaimer is not, perhaps, a complete one. In its recently published Code of
Practice (No. 10), ‘The provision of information and advice’, the Revenue states
that an ‘application which sets out all the relevant facts and draws attention to all
the issues’ can be ‘relied’ upon by the taxpayer. So there is, it seems, at present
some degree of assurance for the taxpayer who satisfies the Revenue’s criteria of
stating all relevant facts and issues, although exactly what standard of disclosure
is necessary remains unclear.
16
However, even if the Revenue may be reluctant to resile from advice given to a
taxpayer, this does not change the fact that it is free under the law to do so. The
taxpayer who wishes to estop the Revenue from changing its determination must
persuade the court, in an action for judicial review, that he had a legitimate
expectation that the Revenue would stand by its advice and, moreover, that it
would be unfair and an abuse of power for the Revenue to recant its stated
position. Because in such an action the courts will look to the Revenue’s conduct
vis-à-vis the taxpayer, rather than at the legal merits of the taxpayer’s transactions
or affairs that underlie the dispute, this mechanism of appeal from the informal
rulings process is a frustrating one; in part because judicial review is a
discretionary remedy, but mainly because the underlying tax-law issues are likely
to become no clearer.
It is therefore submitted that, with respect to pre-transaction rulings, the
Revenue came to the wrong conclusion in its Consultative Document when it
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stated that the present advisory system offers the same level of certainty to the
taxpayer as would any future system of formal rulings.
17 The Revenue made this
mistake because it assumed that authority for a formal system would not stem
from statute but would again be a matter of administrative practice.
18 While the
Revenue noted that a formal rulings system would raise the possibility of appeals,
it failed to recognise that the different nature and ground of the appeal that would
be available would have had implications for the extent to which reliance may be
placed on the rulings themselves.
The Consultative Document on pre-transaction rulings accepted that one
incentive for introducing a formal regime of binding rulings is that it would mean
an increased range of transaction types from which rulings were available to the
taxpayer.
19 On the other hand, it cited a loss of flexibility as the corresponding
disadvantage. At the risk of pointing out the obvious, this apparent loss of
flexibility makes no difference to a taxpayer who wishes for advice that the
Revenue could be estopped from withdrawing. The decided cases set out stringent
requirements that a taxpayer seeking judicial review must satisfy,
20 and it is
difficult to envisage how a formal system could have more strict prerequisites for
reliance, especially when one compares the draft criteria contained in the
Consultative Documents themselves.
21 It should also be noticed that case law has
not yet established that a taxpayer may succeed in an action for judicial review
where he was or should have been aware that he was not applying to the
appropriate level of authority within the Revenue.
22 It is surely undeniable that the
present system of informal rulings and advice can be improved to provide the
taxpayer with a greater degree of certainty. In any event, one might sensibly doubt
whether there can be a loss of flexibility in a system when faced by the prospect of
an option being added.
2. The Problem of Integrating Rulings with Existing Revenue Practice
23
The foregoing paragraph assumes, of course, that binding rulings will not be
implemented at the expense of the present system. It is certainly true that one
pitfall of any advance rulings system is the risk of displacing existing, valuable
procedures. The Revenue would rightly like to maintain and preserve the goodwill
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of the public which hitherto it has cultivated through the provision of informal
advice. In particular, it was anxious not to sacrifice that goodwill by choosing in
future to advise only in a formal-ruling capacity. It has therefore proposed to
continue providing existing services in tandem with any formal system of advance
rulings that is introduced, an attitude the Law Society endorses.
24 The concern
arises particularly in respect of pre-transaction rulings, since there is likely to be a
difficulty over where to draw the line of responsibility at which the availability of
informal advice ends and an application for formal rulings should be possible or
even necessary, an issue that is of reduced practical importance if the transaction
has already been implemented.
It should at once be stated that there is no difficulty of principle here. The
addition of a formal rulings mechanism is not in itself a reason for the diminution
of informal advice, particularly since the Revenue proposed to charge for pre-
transaction rulings and would therefore not need to divert funding away from
existing services. With respect to the practical issues, reference to the New
Zealand solution may be apposite, since there is a marked similarity between the
informal facilities provided by New Zealand’s tax administration and those now
operating in the UK. New Zealand has chosen to operate parallel systems of
formal and informal advice. Published advice to the world at large is restricted to
topics upon which the New Zealand Commissioner for Inland Revenue is
precluded from pronouncing in binding rulings. These include statements on
administrative practice and matters covered by the Administration Act 1994, such
as the imposition of penalties.
25 Informal, non-binding, advice continues to be
available to taxpayers regarding specific issues pertaining to their own affairs.
This advice is available from district offices or, in the case of corporations, from
the Corporates Unit.
26 One significant difference between the New Zealand
approach and the system proposed for the UK is that formal rulings in New
Zealand are issued from a central office, whereas it is envisaged that the UK
system should be operated from local offices. More will be said about this
difference below. But the separation of sources of informal and formal advice in
New Zealand does seem to have been a helpful step in drawing a successful divide
between the operation of the two systems of rulings, and, were that step to be
adopted in the UK, it is submitted that the integration problems foreseen by the
Revenue would be minimised.
3. Self-Assessment, and the Policy Rationales for an Advance Rulings Regime
Thus far, we have seen that the availability of binding pre-transaction rulings, in
particular, would in fact augment rather than duplicate the existing informal
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system. There are other reasons for implementing pre- and post-transaction rulings
systems, which we should now consider.
One may infer from the Revenue’s Consultative Documents that it believes a
formal system of post-transaction rulings would be a positive step in the
performance of its duties of ‘collection and management of the inland revenue’.
27
Central to this belief is its conclusion that such a system would assist in the
transition to a self-assessment system of tax administration for about one-third of
taxpayers in the UK.
28 It is said that taxpayers who are affected by self-
assessment will have to take a more ‘pro-active’ role in the management of their
tax affairs. The availability of post-transaction rulings will ‘assist taxpayers to
comply with their obligations, and encourage voluntary compliance with tax
laws’.
29
It is not disputed that relevant advice from the Revenue will assist the taxpayer
in complying with his obligations. However, it is submitted that the existing
system of informal advice (described above, which the Revenue intends to
maintain) readily provides such advice as is necessary for complying with the self-
assessment process. A taxpayer who wants to know what declaration he should
make in respect of a particular transaction is unlikely to go to the trouble of
seeking a formal ruling rather than informal advice merely in order to complete his
return or check his calculations. Indeed, that is not the point of a formal rulings
system. It does not make good sense to institute a formal system for the benefit of
just a third of the taxpaying public if resources are limited and there is already a
system in place that offers comparable support (at least, for the purpose
nominated by the Inland Revenue).
The foregoing paragraph needs some elaboration. The taxpayer only has reason
to obtain a formal post-transaction ruling if (i) there are significant penalties
applicable to persons who rely in their self-assessment upon a favourable informal
ruling from which the Revenue later resiles, or if (ii) he has a particular need to
know the tax status of his affairs in advance of the date at which the Revenue’s
assessment will be available. Given this, there are a number of points that ought to
be made about the relationship between an advance rulings regime and its
underlying policy rationales, all of which bear upon the usefulness of providing —
as the Revenue now contemplates — only post-transaction rulings.
First, since post-transaction rulings only arise where the relevant taxation
liabilities have already been incurred, the Revenue’s role at that point is merely to
discern that the transaction is accurately characterised for tax purposes. The
capacity to discharge this role, it is submitted, requires only that there is adequate
disclosure by the taxpayer, and as such is not the exclusive province of any system
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of formal (or even informal) rulings. As Sandler has pointed out,
30 it is possible
for taxpayers who make the appropriate level of disclosure to receive assurances
on the non-imposition of penalties or interest if the Revenue disagrees with an
assessment, by amending the existing statutory provisions dealing with penalties
and interest. This simple statutory amendment would avoid the drain on resources
that would be involved in implementing a post-transaction rulings regime for self-
assessing taxpayers.
This is not to assert that post-transaction rulings are of no value whatsoever.
On the Revenue’s own view, rulings merely assist by adding an element of legal
certainty to the process by which the correct taxation status of a transaction or
balance sheet is ascertained. On that view, I have argued, post-transaction rulings
have little to offer the taxpayer. But the Revenue’s perception is incomplete: post-
transaction rulings, like pre-transaction rulings (though in a different manner), are
important because they are capable also of offering economic certainty of future
obligations and cash flows. For some taxpayers, that reassurance, operating
between the dates of the ruling and finalisation of the tax payable, will be a
valuable facility.
The argument advanced by the Revenue, that post-transaction rulings offer a
form of (legal) certainty that will assist with self-assessment, should also be
queried regarding the Revenue’s implicit commitment to the philosophy underlying
self-assessment. As is the case in New Zealand,
31 the UK does not at the moment
propose to operate a comprehensive system of self-assessment of the form
envisaged, for example, in Australia. This is made quite apparent by the fact that
the Revenue is targeting only a third of taxpayers. Another indication of the
limited extent to which responsibility to pay tax due is to be transferred to self-
assessing taxpayers is found in the language used by the Revenue when
characterising the role of the self-assessment regime: statements that the effect of
the system will be to encourage taxpayers to be ‘pro-active’, and that taxpayers
are entitled to expect the Inland Revenue to ‘help you to get your tax affairs
right’,
32 contrast starkly with the Australian attitude that ‘it is a taxpayer’s
responsibility to comply with the tax laws’.
33 Further, the penalty structure in
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Australia has been amended to require taxpayers to show that they have ‘exercised
reasonable care’
34 in the conduct of their affairs and that they have taken a
‘reasonably arguable position’
35 where large amounts of tax are at stake. The UK,
by comparison, proposes to leave its position on penalties and interest unaltered.
36
Given the less than whole-hearted commitment to self-assessment in the UK, and
especially in light of the fact that there is existing support for affected taxpayers, it
is difficult to justify the Revenue’s preference for making post-transaction rulings
the priority. Simply put, the Revenue’s case for a post-transaction rulings regime
is not founded on a consistent underlying policy rationale.
4. Conclusion: The Need for Both Regimes
We have noted the advantages of having a formal pre-transaction ruling process.
Certainly, the introduction of such a regime would give taxpayers greater
assurance of certainty than do the existing facilities for informal advice. One
question arises as counterpart to the Revenue’s own analysis: would it be possible
to shape a pre-transaction rulings regime which by itself would achieve the stated
policy objective of growth in businesses and inward investments — so that the UK
should be adopting a pre-transaction rulings regime exclusively? The answer is no.
Operating both pre- and post-transaction rulings regimes in tandem is, it is
submitted, necessary if one is best to achieve the objective of supporting economic
growth. The reason for this is that growth very rarely results only from isolated
transactions. An economically-successful taxpayer will attempt to replicate his
success. The chances of doing so are considerably increased by having certainty
with regard to his fiscal affairs. The taxpayer would want to be certain of the tax
implications of both his previous and current transactions, in order to make
decisions about future risk. It is true that he may be able to obtain a degree of
assurance without relying on a formal post-transaction rulings procedure.
37 But
where there is reassurance rather than certainty, there is risk. Investment and
business decisions made subject to this sort of risk — for which there is no
prospect of an increased return to compensate — are inherently inefficient. And
inefficient business activity must be regarded as undesirable.
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Even as the Revenue intimated its preference for a post-transaction rulings
regime in the Consultative Documents, one Minister was expressing his
enthusiasm for implementing a pre-transaction rulings procedure. Stephen Dorrell
MP, speaking at the annual dinner of the Association of Her Majesty’s Inspectors
of Taxes and Senior Revenue Officials, stated that ‘Rulings are a logical part of
customer service. It is helpful when the Revenue can provide guidance for
taxpayers about prospective transactions where the application of the law is
uncertain. Advance rulings would benefit industry and the ordinary taxpayer.
They would provide a clearer, more certain system, consistent with the principles
of self-assessment’.
38 The address was reprinted in the Revenue’s own press
release
39 which announced the Revenue’s initiative on a system of advance rulings
for the UK. The Revenue’s statement echoed the Minister’s sentiments and
claimed that its proposals would make the UK tax environment ‘clearer and more
certain, and should encourage new business development and inward
investment’.
40
IV. ACHIEVING THE POLICY OBJECTIVES:
CHARACTERISTICS OF A UK SYSTEM
Law reform is not just about urging change. It is also about how to implement that
change. Given that a binding rulings regime is beneficial, what form should it
take? I do not propose here to discuss all possible aspects of a formal system of
advance rulings.
41 Rather, I hope in this section to highlight some of the more
problematic variables in the Revenue’s own proposals, especially in light of
overseas experiences, and to consider how those variables correlate with the
underlying policy objectives that make advance rulings desirable. The discussion
is intended to apply not only to the post-transaction proposal the Revenue has
affirmed, but also to the pre-transaction version that it has (one hopes merely)
deferred, and, in part, to the contemplated possibility of product rulings.
1. Who Should Issue Formal Binding Rulings?
The Consultative Documents issued by the Revenue adopt the view that it is the
appropriate body to issue binding rulings. This position is consistent with virtually
                                                                                                                             
38Emphasis added.
39Of 12 May 1994.
40Compare the response by the CIT, Pre-Transaction Rulings (TIR/7/96), § 2.4: ‘Our experience is that overseas-
owned businesses expect a greater degree of certainty than local companies and indeed are surprised to learn that a
rulings system is not already in place. This aspect has implications for inward investment decisions’.
41In particular, I will not deal here with the largely practical problem of how onerous should be the disclosure
requirements, nor with the range of taxes and taxpayers for which rulings should be available, though I am broadly
in agreement with the ICAEW and CIT submissions on these matters (see paras 15–20 and §§ 3.1–3.6
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all international jurisdictions that offer the facility,
42 with the exception of Sweden.
It has, however, been suggested that the UK might choose an independent body
such as the Special Commissioners to provide the rulings facility.
43 While there
are not strong reasons to oppose such a suggestion, it does have drawbacks. In
particular, doing so would remove the obvious source of a fast-track, single-tier
appeal. Additionally, the Revenue itself, being accustomed and indeed expert in
making informal rulings, might well be a more efficient source of formal rulings. It
is posited here that the role of the Special Commissioners should be reserved for
hearing appeals from unfavourable rulings. I shall revisit this point below.
2. Should a System of Rulings be Statutory or Administrative?
A formal system of binding rulings should be founded in statute, in order that the
authority to make such rulings be manifestly clear and that the regime be available
to the taxpayer as of right — without the possibility that its application might be
treated as discretionary. Administrative ‘flexibility’ might well lead to the
undermining of that right.
44 Moreover, since the statutory scheme would be merely
an enabling framework, the dangers of its becoming inflexible are surely not
excessive. The reassurance provided by an ‘overt’ statutory framework would not,
it is submitted, be unappreciated by the taxpayer who has to choose whether or not
to subject himself to the high standard of disclosure required in order to obtain a
ruling.
45
3. Withdrawing a Ruling
Even with statutory backing, however, where a binding ruling has been made in
favour of a taxpayer, the assurance of certainty afforded by this ruling is not
absolute. New Zealand provides its Commissioner of Revenue with the power to
unilaterally ‘withdraw’ binding rulings. This right of withdrawal can be
exercised,
46 for example, when a conflicting court decision arises or simply where
the New Zealand Commissioner discovers that he made an incorrect ruling. Of
course, the availability of such a right threatens to undermine the very causa
vivendi of a formal and binding regime — hence the ability to retract a ruling is
hemmed in by certain constraints. The Commissioner must give notice of his
decision to withdraw the incorrect ruling, and the withdrawal can only take effect
from the date specified in the notice of withdrawal. In the case of pre-transaction
                                                                                                                             
42Australia, Canada, Germany, the US and New Zealand.
43Sandler, A Request for Rulings at p. 44.
44My view thus differs from that expressed by the ICAEW (Tax 7/96: Pre-Transaction Rulings, para. 31), which
favours the ‘flexibility’ of an administrative system.
45See note 21. There are exceptional situations where statutory clearances already entitle taxpayers to formal
binding rulings: see note 14.
46Income Tax Amendment Act 1994 (NZ), ss. 91 DE (withdrawal of a public ruling), 91 EI (withdrawal of a
private ruling) and 91 FJ (withdrawal of a product ruling).Fiscal Studies
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rulings, the notice to withdraw a ruling is effective only if that notice is
communicated to the taxpayer before the relevant transaction takes place. In this
respect, Australian taxpayers are offered a greater protection, because the power
of unilateral withdrawal cannot be exercised in Australia if the income year to
which the ruling relates has commenced or ended.
47 This is a significant and, it is
submitted, warranted further safeguard — notwithstanding the view of Sandler,
who opposes such a limitation on the Commissioner’s power of unilateral
withdrawal and argues that it is an unjustified constraint as withdrawal does not
affect the taxpayer who has not yet commenced his transaction.
48 With respect to
Sandler, he misses the policy argument in favour of protecting the Australian
taxpayer in this situation — an argument that applies to both pre- and post-
transaction rulings. In order to have a climate of confidence for business and
investment, taxpayers must be able to make plans in advance which should be as
certain as possible in the short term, and ideally also in the medium term. The need
for economic certainty increases the more proximate those plans are to
implementation. This exigency means that a high degree of reliability indeed is
required by a taxpayer who has committed himself to (though not yet
implemented) a transaction for the very income year he is now in and to which the
ruling relates. Where short- and medium-term affairs are certain, the taxpayer is
able to gauge the degree of risk he might wish to bear in future endeavours. The
Australian provision affords, in effect, a minimum period of notice.
49 Without that
protection, to require taxpayers to have ‘fall-back’ positions, which can be
instantly translated into profitable action were a ruling to be unilaterally
withdrawn, would be unrealistic and would severely reduce the attractiveness of
binding rulings. Further, it would be gravely unjust. This would be especially true
where rulings are charged for and no provision is made for a refund and
compensation for consequential loss. The UK would be doing much more to
achieve its desire for economic growth were it to follow the Australian lead in this
respect.
4. Who Should Be Bound by the Ruling?
As the main attribute of binding rulings is the assurance of certainty to the
taxpayer, clearly the Revenue must be bound by its rulings. The question arises as
to whether there is any compelling policy argument for binding the taxpayer too.
                                                                                                                             
47Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Australia), s. 14 ZAU(4).
48Sandler, A Request for Rulings at p. 63.
49The similar option of a minimum period of validity, during which the ruling may not be rescinded by the Revenue,
is generally endorsed in the responses. See, for example, Simons Tax Intelligence 1996 at p. 685; CIT, Pre-
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At the root of this issue is the truth that binding rulings are not law,
50 even though
in effect they assume the guise of law by enabling the taxpayer to rely, at law, on a
favourable ruling.
The guise of law loses its appeal in cases where the taxpayer receives an
unfavourable ruling. Should the taxpayer who receives an adverse ruling have the
right to appeal to the law? The answer given to this question has varied. In
Australia, the taxpayer is bound by a binding ruling. Rather surprisingly, this does
not mean that he must adopt the ruling if it is adverse to him. There are no
automatic penalties applicable to the taxpayer for merely exercising his choice to
disregard an adverse ruling. Prima facie, should the taxpayer later be audited by
the Australian Commissioner and be found to have a tax shortfall as a result of
adopting a different view from that taken in the ruling, a special category of
penalty will apply. The penalty is 25 per cent of the amount of tax understated.
51
However, this penalty is not payable if, on the view taken by a court, there is in
fact no tax owing. More importantly, even if the underlying tax is due, it is
possible to prevent the surcharge penalty provision from biting if the taxpayer can
show that he took a reasonably arguable position alternative to that adopted in the
ruling.
52 There is thus a finesse to the Australian position that rulings are ‘binding’
on the taxpayer. The special category of penalty is designed to encourage
compliance with rulings (and is therefore an effective accompaniment to self-
assessment), without being heavy-handed.
The Australian taxpayer who feels that the Commissioner has erred in ruling
against him can take the ruling itself through the appeals process, just as if his
were an ordinary appeal against assessment.
53 While the right of appeal is often an
unattractive option, owing to the delays that can be expected to result from the fact
that there is no distinct appeals procedure, the right to take the ruling itself on
appeal is an important aspect of fairness within the system as well as a constraint
upon substantive error.
In New Zealand, a mistaken belief that the Australian system leads to
automatic penalties being imposed on non-compliant taxpayers has caused
Parliament to rule that the taxpayer should not be bound by rulings. The difficulty
with this alternative approach is that the decision was also taken to abandon the
                                                                                                                             
50Compare ICAEW, Tax 7/96: Pre-Transaction Rulings, para. 29: ‘We do not consider that rulings should bind
the taxpayer since this would in effect mean that the Inland Revenue were in a position to make law. The purpose of
a rulings system is to enable the taxpayer to know the Revenue’s view on the application of the law’.
51Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Australia), s. 226 M.
52In determining whether the taxpayer has a reasonably arguable position, regard is paid to the law, explanatory
memoranda (if any), judicial and administrative appeal decisions, and public rulings (which are legislatively
defined as ‘authority’ for the purposes of the rulings regime: Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Australia), s. 222
(4)(d)).
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right of appeal, as being unnecessary where the taxpayer is not bound.
54 This is
rather like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It casts aside one of the
desired goals of the rulings system, being to enhance compliance through self-
assessment (and thereby reduce the burden on the Revenue). In addition, since the
taxpayer must wait until assessment before objecting to an adverse determination,
the effect (in those cases at least) of this move is to sacrifice another objective of
the regime — the goal of facilitating macroeconomic growth by enabling
taxpayers to obtain certainty about their tax affairs early and at speed.
The issue of whether the taxpayer should be bound by a private ruling arises at
a delicate time in the development of UK fiscal legislation. The pay and file and
self-assessment regimes have been designed to shift partial responsibility for their
tax affairs to taxpayers. When determining what structure a future system of
rulings should take, the legislature must decide just how committed it is to the
eventual implementation of a system of ‘pure’ self-assessment. The extent of its
commitment will be evidenced by the penalty provisions that apply to a taxpayer
who gets his self-assessment ‘wrong’. If there is such a commitment, then the
taxpayer, in turn, must be supported by an effective appeals process. An
assessment of the UK advance-rulings proposal suggests that a long-term
commitment to pure self-assessment is lacking. The Consultative Documents
appear to have misunderstood the Australian system, and, as is the case in New
Zealand, the Revenue has proposed not to bind the taxpayer and ‘correspondingly’
not to provide for a system of appeals.
55
Apropos of pre-transaction rulings, the Revenue was quite correct to state that
‘a right of appeal may not be of much practical benefit because the time involved
in moving through the Commissioners and the Courts may well be too protracted
to allow certainty to be obtained quickly enough for prospective transactions’.
This factor, too, was pertinent to the New Zealand decision. But instead of
abandoning appeals, a better answer might be to speed them up. Sandler
56 has
suggested that there might be an accelerated right of appeal to a single tier;
namely, to the Special Commissioners. He suggests that further rights to appeal
may be available after the assessment process (possibly direct to the courts if an
agreed statement of fact is reached with the Special Commissioners). Even though
the need for urgency may be less pressing in a purely post-transaction rulings
regime, this suggestion still merits serious consideration. Given that it is of one tier
only, it ought not to be unduly difficult, administratively speaking, to design a
                                                                                                                             
54It was assumed that ‘binding’ on the taxpayer meant that automatic penalties applied if a taxpayer did not follow
the ruling. See Binding Rulings on Taxation, a discussion document on the proposed New Zealand regime
(Government Printer, Wellington, 1994), paras 1.9 and 4.5.
55Compare Pre-Transaction Rulings, paras 2.21–2.25. The same view was adopted, without discussion, by the
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‘fast-track’ process of the type suggested by Sandler. Any subsequent appeals
from this process should suffer the normal delays of the ordinary appeals process.
5. Who Should Issue Rulings — Local Offices or the Centre?
Virtually all commentators prefer to see rulings issued from a central office. In
practice, there is less unanimity: Canada, Sweden, the US and New Zealand
operate from the centre, whereas Australia and Germany utilise their local offices.
There is an obvious appeal in the suggestion that rulings should be issued
centrally, since one might expect that those rulings are more likely to exhibit the
virtues of consistency in application and quality. However, at least one
commentator, speaking in the UK context, has argued that there may be a case for
using the local tax inspector, because there is arguably little difference between an
inspector’s stating ‘how he would think it right to approach an individual case (a
private ruling) and his actual handling of that case (an assessment)’.
57 While the
remark is true in the context of a singular transaction, central offices have the
advantage of volume with which to build up a body of (documented) knowledge
and expertise that can be deployed both consistently and recurrently. The
accumulated information will be close at hand and will require only a ‘single-tier’
processing service by the Revenue. A further consideration is that using a
centralised system will prevent taxpayers from ‘shopping’ for a favourable ruling,
and from playing one local office against another.
In the long term, one may expect that the taxpaying community will come to
have confidence in the judgment of the central office, because it will be able to
claim — and in time demonstrate — expert knowledge. Eventually, the beneficial
consequence of this should be a reduced number of objections and fewer cases
litigated in courts. There could thus be a real saving in terms of administrative and
compliance costs.
I have mentioned that Australia and Germany have chosen to source advance
rulings from local tax offices. There appears in these cases to be a direct
relationship between the ability of these countries to recover costs and their service
delivery structure. Fees are charged for the provision of rulings in Canada,
Sweden, the US and New Zealand, all of which provide rulings from central
offices. By contrast, Australia and Germany provide a free system of binding
rulings, but operate through the Revenue’s branch offices. The inability to recover
costs seems to have been an influential factor in the decision to distribute the
administrative and financial burden of providing binding rulings. Especially were
cost-recovery to be imposed, the weight of reasons in favour of issuing rulings
from the centre would appear to make that the appropriate option for the UK. The
complexity and rapid pace of change in tax legislation only serve to underline the
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advantages of having a centralised, specialist department for determining the tax
status of complicated transactions.
6. Should Fees Be Chargeable?
There is considerable international precedent for the recovery of costs incurred in
the supply of formal binding rulings. Sandler argues that since a taxpayer who
chooses to litigate against his assessment will be liable for at least some of his
legal costs, it is only right that the provision of a rulings service be chargeable;
especially since, in his view, rulings are comparatively cheaper. He proposes that
rulings should be charged for on a ‘user pays’ basis, and suggests a number of
alternative mechanisms for calculating an appropriate fee.
58
The analogy with the costs of litigation is imperfect, since the Revenue is not
an independent judge. None the less, the merits of Sandler’s argument must be
addressed. On the view he advances, it is implicitly right that fees should be
charged for advance rulings, in order to ensure that the facility is self-financing.
Indeed, he acknowledges little reason not to do so. He believes that the most
compelling reason for not charging fees is the principle that all taxpayers have the
right to know the manner in which tax legislation is applied, but argues that since
there is no legal obligation on the Revenue to provide binding interpretations to the
taxpayer in any case, the force of this argument is fatally diminished.
To my mind, this is an incomplete analysis, one that considers neither the other
costs incurred by the taxpayer in seeking a ruling nor the advantages to be gained
by the Revenue from having a system of rulings. The Revenue has made it known
that it fears a loss of revenue were advance rulings to be implemented.
59 The
amount of the loss is not knowable. Conversely, however, the Revenue gains
valuable information which is cumulative over time. With very little effort on the
part of the department, it will acquire information with which to build up intimate
profiles of taxpayers’ finances. The taxpayer who seeks an advance ruling must
incur non-computable (and, in part, non-monetary) costs arising from the
disclosure of private information, as well as the cost of employing legal and
financial advice
60 and the cost of any later appeal. Cost-recovery is not merely
that: it is also a form of cost-transfer, since it would enable the Revenue to charge
a fee in order to scrutinise the taxpayer’s information and desired ruling, when
hitherto it has been obliged to compose the tax characterisation itself as part of its
assessment function. And with the advent of self-assessment, most ordinary
taxpayers will be paying in addition for compliance advice. (This factor, in
particular, may well have informed the Australian decision not to charge for the
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element’ (Response to Pre-Transaction Rulings at p. 2).
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rulings service.)
61 Moreover, given the regime’s announced objective of increasing
business and investment activity and income, it is possible that there would be
indirect cost-recovery in any event, since the Revenue’s coffers ought to be
augmented by the consequent increase in tax due. One could also note that
preparation of the submission by the taxpayer’s legal and financial advisers is
likely to save the Revenue from much of the mechanical and drafting work
involved in assessing and providing a ruling. More generally, the use of advance
rulings will save the Revenue from incurring post-transaction processing and
litigation costs — normally incurred, after all, only because of the complexity and
impenetrability of the state’s legislation.
62
There may in addition be an unwelcome and unanticipated side-effect of
allowing the Revenue to charge for the provision of rulings. Were the market-place
to operate normally, one might expect sizeable tax practices in large population
centres to position themselves to take advantage of the new compliance pressures
on affected taxpayers. In the fullness of time, some firms will be favoured either
because of their aggressive marketing or for their expertise with regard to rulings
advice, or perhaps both. The price of advice from such leading firms is likely to be
substantial. If the Revenue were permitted to take expert advice when making
rulings, as is the case in New Zealand,
63 the taxpayer would be obliged to
reimburse the Revenue for considerable costs. It is not inconceivable that large tax
practices may experience a ‘rulings bonanza’, opposing (as well as representing)
64
the hapless taxpayer with considerable resources and at his own expense.
7. Exclusions
There will clearly be situations in which the Revenue would wish to be able to
refuse to rule. Two sorts of cases are worth mentioning here. The first arises in
respect of rulings where the taxpayer has already been assessed. The second is
extremely important and relates to issues of anti-avoidance.
The Consultative Documents are silent on the question of rulings where an
assessment has already been made. New Zealand specifically provides that the
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Commissioner will not make binding rulings in this situation. Australia gives the
Commissioner a discretion not to rule where an assessment has been made outside
the formal self-assessment regime. The examples these two jurisdictions provide
reveal differing policy commitments. The New Zealand position illustrates the
government’s present reluctance to anticipate a full system of self-assessment,
since it envisages continuing to make assessments itself; by contrast, the
Australian provision, which does not consider the question relevant where formal
self-assessment procedures are in place, evidences its commitment to that system.
The UK position regarding the overlap between assessments and rulings will need
to reflect its longer-term ambitions for self-assessment.
With regard to the possibility of excluding an application on the grounds that it
is made for the purpose of avoiding taxation, not much recourse to the
Commonwealth jurisdictions can be had on this issue. This is because the
comparable jurisdictions of Australia, Canada and New Zealand are each endowed
with general anti-avoidance legislation. Without the benefit of such legislation, the
Revenue does appear to have been concerned by the possibility that a pre-
transaction rulings procedure might assume the guise of safety net for would-be
tax avoiders. It fears
65 that pre-transaction rulings would enable taxpayers to ‘test
the waters’ by inviting the Revenue first to issue binding opinions where tax
legislation might be vulnerable or defective. And it argues that an avoidance
industry might arise with the Revenue’s unintentional blessing were binding
opinions, allowing exploitation of legislative weaknesses, to be introduced.
In the absence of a general anti-avoidance provision,
66 these considerations
seem to have been regarded by the Revenue as an important reason against
introducing pre-transaction rulings at all. Even had it decided to proceed with such
a regime, the Revenue would therefore have favoured reserving the power to
decline a ruling where, in its view, the proposed transaction is tainted by an anti-
avoidance purpose. It will presumably seek a similar reservation in respect of
product rulings. Such a clause, turning as it does upon the Revenue’s own
recognisance, would significantly limit the advantages to be gained from a system
of advance rulings in terms of the reliability of taxpayer projections and the
creation of a climate for growth and investment. Were the Revenue to refuse a
ruling whenever anti-avoidance was suspected, many transactions might end up
being abandoned unnecessarily. Perhaps even more importantly, it is submitted
that the Revenue was taking a remarkably defensive approach in seeking the right
to choose only to respond to inquiries where the law is clearly and robustly
drafted. Surely a taxpayer requires advice particularly where the law is unclear?
Is not unclear law a raison d’être for advance rulings? And if an examination of
the law does show that it is defective, then does the Revenue not benefit by having
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the defect brought to its attention? One may expect that, in the Revenue’s other
role as advisor to the Crown, the defect will swiftly be remedied.
In addition to these practical points, however, a substantive objection may be
made. In recent years, the Revenue has responded to the fact that the UK lacks a
general doctrine of anti-avoidance by exercising its advisory role actively to
influence the drafting of more and more detailed legislation, replete with specific
anti-avoidance clauses, some of which are of strict liability in their effect.
67 It
would therefore seem inappropriate to empower the Revenue to pre-emptively
reject ‘suspect’ applications. It is submitted that to do so would be, in effect, to
implement a purpose- or motive-based anti-avoidance principle where legislative
practice has recognised that none exists. Such a principle is entirely contrary to the
traditional perception of anti-avoidance in the UK: that it is the duty of the courts
to determine the tax characterisation of the arrangement in question by applying
extant law to the facts as determined. The court has no power to disregard a
transaction just because it is prompted by tax avoidance; the question is ‘in every
case, what is the true effect in law of the real transaction?’.
68
The close connection seen by the Revenue between advance rulings and
avoidance is in fact spurious.
69 Since it is the law in the UK that the subjective
motive of the taxpayer cannot be invoked in order to strike down a transaction, it
is submitted that the UK taxpayer should be entitled to a ruling by the Revenue
based on his transaction as it stands.
70
V. CONCLUSION
The Revenue’s approach to advance rulings raises many questions. The policy
goal that has dominated and shaped that approach is one of facilitating accuracy in
the assessment of tax due. This is an apt ambition to accompany self-assessment.
But tax administration reform can also have substantive economic implications,
something the Revenue has failed to recognise properly. There are real benefits to
be gained from employing a binding system of advance rulings in the UK,
particularly in terms of facilitating fiscal-planning and risk-management by
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economically-productive taxpayers. It is submitted that those benefits justify
implementing pre-transaction as well as post-transaction rulings. In addition,
however, many of the more detailed aspects of the suggested regime do not reflect
its economic rationale either, something that a comparison with overseas
precedents assists to highlight. Much remains to be done, in order to ensure we
craft a scheme that will achieve the policy objectives within a modern tax system
— especially, one that will achieve the sort of protection for taxpayers that is its
causa vivendi.